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In 1973, the people of Detroit elected their first African-American Mayor, Coleman
Alexander Young. In electing him, the people charged him with a mission to save the once
prosperous industrial capital from the forces tearing it down. Economically and socially,
Detroit had reached a breaking point. Coming in at the tail end of the civil rights Movement
and in the middle of deindustrialization in the Midwest, Coleman Young had to become not
only a mayor, but also a businessman, a symbol for African-Americans, a national
spokesman, but most importantly a visionary, someone who could imagine a better Detroit
and to take his own words, someone who could move Detroit forward despite everything
holding it down.
Detroit came into the spotlight once again in July 2013, becoming the first major US
city to declare bankruptcy. In just 60 years, the city had gone from the world capital of
industry to a mere skeleton, quite literally speaking, of its former self. Hollowed out
buildings make up much of the downtown. The roads once occupied with cars like blood
pulsing through veins now just have potholes and commuters who make their way in from
the suburbs. The New York Times bluntly stated, “The City of Detroit is in shambles.”1
The media focused on the demise of the United States motor industry as the cause of
the economic collapse. Scholars dig deeper saying the problems lie not only in economics
but racial tension that has plagued the city since the 1930s. However, no one can agree on
the exact cause because in reality, there is not just one. Scholars and the media alike anchor
their arguments for Detroit’s decline by drawing conclusions from what they consider to be

Bill Vlasic, “Detroit is Now a Charity Case for Carmakers,” The New York Times, September
22, 2013.
1
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the most important events. Yet, in writing one story, another is silenced. This is the case in
in Detroit where pivotal events such as the 1967 Race Riots to the 2008 General Motors
Bailout continually define its history.
This essay offers a clearer picture of the history of Detroit that is not just civil rights
and Motown. In order to do so, I have focused on one man who is a household name to
Detroiters: Coleman A. Young. Coleman Young, elected Mayor in 1973, remained mayor for
five terms until he retired in 1994. He was the first African American Mayor of Detroit, and
his race would define him throughout his time as mayor. The FBI suspected him of being a
communist due to his aggressive personality and leadership roles in unions. As a politician,
he aligned with the progressive and democratic parties holding positions under all three
labels. Coleman Young himself never went to college and spoke with an unrefined language
that never ceased to shock. On his desk in the Manoogian Mansion, he had a nameplate
inscribed with a self-assigned title: “M.F.I.C.” which stood for Motherfucker In Charge, a title
he took very seriously.
Coleman Young left his mark on Detroit and you cannot escape his influence when
you visit the city. The Detroit skyline is defined by the Renaissance Center, which is one of
Young’s major projects. The Renaissance Center. Mayor Young managed the building of The
Joe Louis Arena, home of the Detroit Redwings. The elevated “People Mover” that runs
through downtown is the direct product of Coleman Young’s vision for Detroit. However,
his vision for the city did not stop at the physical appearance, but included reshaping many
long-standing institutions. Young created a diverse police force and restructured the way
the police department operated. He also focused heavily on bringing shopping malls and
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boutiques back downtown from the suburbs. All in all, Coleman Young accomplished a
great deal even for twenty years.
Despite all he accomplished, many Detroiters believe Coleman Young failed as
Mayor and is to blame for its current condition. I know this because my family is from and
many still live in Detroit. My grandfather worked in the Ford Motor’s plants and watched
the city go from prosperous to its current condition. My grandparents, aunts, uncles, and
stepdad unanimously agree that Coleman Young singlehandedly caused “white flight,”
which led to the ultimate downfall of the city. I responded to these remarks by saying
surely they weren’t so naïve as to believe one man caused the collapse of Detroit. More
interestingly, my suburban, white, middle class family shares this opinion with the majority
of people from Detroit. In the New York Times Bestseller, Detroit: An American Autopsy,
Charlie LeDuff recorded one African American woman saying, “Coleman Young…he ruined
that city.”2 The national media replicated and redistributed the same message making
Coleman Young a posthumous scapegoat.
In response, the Detroit Free Press published an article entitled, “How Detroit went
broke: The Answers may surprise you – and don’t blame Coleman Young.”3 The authors of
the article compiled economic data and argued that every mayor, even some before
Coleman Young are to blame for Detroit’s bankruptcy: “When all the numbers are
crunched, one fact is crystal clear: Yes, a disaster was looming for Detroit. But there were
ample opportunities when decisive action by city leaders might have fended off

Charlie LeDuff, Detroit: An American Autopsy (New York: The Penguin Press, 2013),
Nathan Bomey, John Gallagher and Detroit, Detroit Free Press Business Writers, “How
Detroit went broke: The answers may surprise you - don’t blame Coleman Young,” The
Detroit Free Press, September 15, 2013.
2
3

6
bankruptcy…Over five decades, there were many ‘if only’ moments.”4 The article used
graphs where the reader can easily see that during Coleman Young’s time in office, Detroit’s
debt dropped to $1.4 billion and revenue reached $2.1 billion. The article reads, “For critics
who want to blame Mayor Coleman Young for starting this mess, think again. The mayor’s
sometimes fiery rhetoric may have contributed to metro Detroit’s racial divide, but he was
an astute money manager who recognized, early on, the challenges the city faced and began
slashing staff and spending to address them.”5 The Detroit Free Press Article argued that
the city had many chances to revive itself financially but the Mayor and city leadership
missed opportunity after opportunity, Coleman Young being least to blame. In short,
Detroit’s downfall was not inevitable.
For historians, Coleman Young is not the cause of present day Detroit’s problems.
Many prominent scholars have contributed to the conversation on Detroit. Thomas Sugrue,
a prominent historian on Detroit, published The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and
Inequality in Postwar Detroit in 1996 that covered Detroit from World War II right up to the
election of Coleman Young. Sugrue concluded, “What has become of Detroit, however, is not
the product of post-riot panic of the alleged misrule of Coleman Young. By the time Young
was inaugurated, the forces of economic decay and racial animosity were far too powerful
for a single elected official to stem.”6 The economic problems and more importantly race
problems stem back to long before Coleman Young’s time. Sugrue illustrated the
importance of the decline of the automotive industry in Detroit but also pointed out that it
was not the only thing contributing to the downfall of the city. The work addressed the
Bomey and Gallagher, “How Detroit went broke.”
Bomey and Gallagher, “How Detroit went broke.”
6 Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar
Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 270.
4
5
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racial issues in the city that largely manifested in the housing marketplace: “The process of
housing segregation set into motion a chain reaction that reinforced patterns of racial
inequality.” 7 Institutionalized racism in housing, employment, and public policies all lead
to an Urban Crisis in Detroit in the 1960s.
June Manning Thomas, professor of Urban and Regional planning at University of
Michigan, concurred with Sugrue in her work, Redevelopment and Race: Planning a Finer
City in Postwar Detroit. However, Thomas labeled Young, “The single most influential
person in Detroit’s modern history,”8 whereas Sugrue viewed Coleman Young as practically
powerless in the midst of an urban crisis set into motion decades before. For Thomas,
Young single handedly redeveloped Detroit and stalled the city’s downfall. Thomas focused
on Young’s attempt at redevelopment of Detroit through his building of city landmarks and
how these affected the city. Thomas referred to Young as a “messiah mayor,” or, “specialists
who found new ways to govern their distressed big cities.”9 According to Thomas, Young
governed through redevelopment projects that distracted individuals from greater
problems that could not be seen. In simpler terms, Young gave Detroit a facelift to give off
the appearance that the city was not doing poorly.
Historian Heather Ann Thompson added a political aspect to the argument in her
article, “Rethinking the Collapse of Postwar Liberalism: The Rise of Mayor Coleman Young
and the politics of Race in Detroit.” Thompson used Coleman Young as an example of many
citizens dedication to the liberalist “Great Society” in electing an African American as
mayor, a mid-twentieth century trend throughout America’s urban cities. Thompson
Sugrue, Origins of the Urban Crisis, 34.
June Manning Thomas, Redevelopment and Race: Planning a Finer City in Postwar
Detroit (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2013), 149.
9 Thomas, Redevelopment and Race, 151.
7
8
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argued that Detroit voters hoped Coleman Young would maintain a strict liberalist agenda
as mayor. Although Coleman Young campaigned with a liberal agenda, Thompson
demonstrates that he did not maintain this ideology throughout his time in office. The
article offered an excellent perspective on the motivations of voters in reelecting Young
multiple times into office. However, the article does not focus on Mayor Young and his
personal beliefs or even many of his policies. Thompson instead demonstrates how Detroit
voters saw Young as a symbol for both civil rights and liberalism.
Sociologists situated Detroit within the changing economic and racial landscape of
the United States in the latter half of the 20th century. For these scholars, Detroit’s
problems were not unique and part of a national phenomenon amongst urban areas. Thus,
sociologists support historians in that Coleman Young did not have the power to overcome
the urban crisis. Deindustrialization in the Midwest caused unemployment to rise and the
decay of many cities. Along with these issues come sociological problems, particularly for
African Americans. Matthew Desmond and Mustafa Emirbayer placed Detroit in the larger
context in their book, Racial Domination, Racial Progress: The Sociology of Race in America.
Desmond and Emirbayer outlined many national trends in politics and economics that
affected race relations.
Julius Wilson focused on the effects of these changes in urban areas in his book:
When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor. Wilson described the effects of
unemployment on urban areas and emphasized that the resulting lower socio-economic
class becomes isolated from the rest of society physically and ideologically. Wilson wrote,
“The focus is mainly on the shortcomings of individuals and families and not on the
structural and social changes in the society at large that have made life so miserable for
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many inner-city ghetto residents or that have produced certain unique responses and
behavior patterns over time.”10 Wilson asserts that urban poverty cannot correct itself
without government aid. Furthermore, urban poverty stems from unemployment, which is
a result of the deindustrialization in urban areas. Wilson’s crucial analyses of national
trends contextualize Coleman Young and reassign agency from just him or city
governments to larger social and economic forces throughout the United States.
Coleman Young himself wrote an autobiography published shortly after he left office
in 1994. The book, meant to be Young’s input in the making of his own story, focused
heavily on the positive aspects of Young’s entire political career. Coleman Young and
Lonnie Wheeler, his co-author emphasized race and pre-existing problems that Young
faced in becoming mayor. Obviously, Young portrayed himself in a positive light, but he
also did something else in his autobiography that was ubiquitous throughout his mayoral
tenure. Coleman Young presented himself as a leader for the African American community
and one who fought for their needs. In doing so, he contributed to the myth that his racial
identity factored into all of his decisions, which is what his critics believe and use to say
that he made Detroit a hostile environment for the white population. The book provided a
colorful narrative that glaze over the negatives of Young’s time in office. Furthermore,
Young portrayed himself as a racial leader in this book implying that majority of his time in
office was spent bettering the African American condition in Detroit.
Coleman Young envisioned Detroit as equivalent to New York or Chicago. He
consistently used such cities as models for Detroit. Mayor Young did not wish to restore the
economically one dimensional, Motown. He also did not wish to make Detroit a “Black” city,
Julius Wilson, When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor (New York:
Vintage Books, 1997), 53.
10
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where African Americans defined the status quo. Coleman Young’s utopic Detroit had a
diverse economy, racial harmony, and most importantly national significance. From my
research, I learned that the United States underwent massive changes economically and
sociologically from 1974 to 1994. Coleman Young adapted to these changes and faced
issues pragmatically. As a politician, he was an opportunist who did not adhere to any
ideology. However, his vision remained consistent and affected his decisions as mayor. By
trying to enact this vision, Coleman Young spent millions of dollars on the physical
appearance of Detroit in hopes that the racial issues of Detroit would resolve themselves.
This essay compiles the vast amount of historical, sociological, and economic
discourse on Detroit and uses it as a backdrop in which to write about Coleman Young and
his vision for a city. Based on archival research and engagement with history, sociology,
and economics, this paper argues that Coleman Young followed a consistent vision for
Detroit as city with national significance. While scholars have portrayed Coleman Young as
a significant leader for both the Democratic Party and civil rights, I argue that he did not
follow the agendas for either of these ideologies. Consistency in Young’s policies and
especially revival projects revolve around his pursuit of a utopic Detroit defined by a multidimensional, nationally significant economy and a commercialized culture. In order to
implement his vision, Young pragmatically approached economic and sociological
situations and fit his imagined vision into reality.

Growing up in Detroit: A Biography

11
Coleman Young’s personal history and relationship with Detroit shaped his vision
for the city. He considered himself a Detroit native and in his 1973 campaign for mayor, he
ran on the platform that he was the only candidate who truly “understood” Detroit.
Coleman Young did not experience an abnormal amount of racism, which he said might
have been on account of his lighter skin.11 Regardless of the extent, Coleman Young
experienced racism and found ways to either use it to his advantage or combat it indirectly
through employment. He believed races could live together harmoniously due to his own
childhood experience. By looking at Young’s life before he became a politician, we can see
his values and what would later contribute to his vision for the city of Detroit.
Coleman Alexander Young grew up in Detroit and considered it his home. Born in
Tuscaloosa, Alabama on May 24, 1918, Coleman’s family moved to Detroit when he was just
five years old as a part of the Great Migration. The Young family, including Coleman’s
maternal grandparents and aunts and uncles, resided in the Black Bottom neighborhood
near the famous Paradise Valley, a hub for black music and art. Black Bottom would later
become notorious as a low class, black neighborhood. However, when the Young family
migrated to Black Bottom in 1922, the neighborhood was transitioning from integrated to
predominantly African-American. Young recounted, “Our house was next door to an Italian
family, whose daughter, Polly, I frequently played with. There was a Syrian family down the
street, a German grocery on the intersection – I can still smell the sour rye bread – and a
Jewish delicatessen around the corner.”12 Coleman Young experienced integration at a
young age and saw races living harmoniously together. However, by the time Coleman
Coleman Young and Lonnie Wheeler, Hard Stuff: The Autobiography of Mayor Coleman
Young (New York: Penguin Books, 1994), 30.
12 Young and Wheeler, Hard Stuff, 16-17.
11
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reached his teenage years, the entire neighborhood transformed to solely AfricanAmericans. During the late 1920s, Coleman did not experience an abnormal amount of
racial tension in Black Bottom. However, the Great Depression and economic strife would
lead to heightened animosity as unemployment soared.
Prohibition and the Great Depression caused Black Bottom to suffer from perpetual
bootleggers and hustlers. Furthermore, the transition from a diverse, blue-collar
neighborhood to solely black caused isolation and deepened segregation. Wilson
commented on how isolation leads to behavioral patterns such as crime: “In short, social
isolation deprives inner-city residents not only of conventional role models, whose strong
presence once buffered the effects of neighborhood joblessness, but also of the social
resources (including social contracts) provided by mainstream social networks that
facilitate social and economic advancement in a modern industrial society.”13 As Black
Bottom became further isolated due to racism, its residents lost their ability to better their
condition.
Black Bottom, as with many African American neighborhoods, had subpar public
services and living conditions to their Caucasian counterparts. In Detroit, police officers
rarely responded to calls in black neighborhoods allowing criminals to act unchecked.
Unfortunately, the neighborhoods became symbols for African Americans and “evidence”
for the white majority of racial inferiority claiming that crime and lawlessness stem from
race rather than societal structures. Coleman Young lived through this transition, but left
Black Bottom and Paradise Valley long before they would become the target of racial
violence and police brutality.
13

Wilson, When Work Disappears, 66.
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Coleman Young described his childhood as difficult due to his father. William
Coleman Young (who went by his middle name), frequently changed jobs due to
employment instability, which especially affected black men. Despite having a college
degree, William Coleman could not hold down a steady job to support his family. Coleman
the Elder relied heavily on his income from gambling. He also suffered from alcoholism and
was well known for his womanizing. Coleman the younger acted as his father’s go-between
during the years of prohibition, moving money and illegal booze. His mother eventually
would open up a tailor shop that doubled as a home to the entire family, with a business in
the front and Mr. Young’s poker games in the back. Despite all the hardship, Coleman
managed to graduate from high school with good marks.
To say that Mr. Young was worse than most men living in Black Bottom at this time
would be a false accusation. In many ways, Coleman the elder did what he must to survive.
Young stated, “Papa had worked hard all of his life…he did what he could. He and Mama
picked up rags in the alley and found various odd jobs so that my aunt and her children
would not have to eat in the soup kitchen; but I truly believe that the absence of steady
work is what killed him.”14 Amidst racism and a declining economy, the unemployment
rates soared for African-Americans. The society in which the Young’s lived caused Coleman
Young to learn the importance of employment and jobs in creating a successful city.
Coleman became politicized at a young age. In his autobiography, Coleman talked
about the role of black barbershops where he learned about different party lines. Wilbur C.
Rich wrote in his biography of Coleman Young, “In the early days, the black barber shop
served as the center where political ideas were exchanged. Black nationalists, Marxists, and
14

Young and Wheeler, Hard Stuff, 38.
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Christian fundamentalists were allowed to argue their case in this market place of ideas.”15
Coleman regularly went to the barbershop as a version of unofficial schooling where he
molded his own political ideas.
Coleman took a job at the Ford River Rouge Plant in and was part of its apprentice
program. Young never had the opportunity to attend university but sought further
education through the apprentice program. However, he still ended up on the assembly line
with untrained workers because Ford gave the white apprentices jobs before AfricanAmericans with equal or better qualifications. Due to these inequalities, Coleman began to
attend workers’ unions meetings but never pledged membership.
Young sympathized with unions due to the inequalities he felt in the workplace.
Such sentiments translated into political views centering on jobs and workers’ rights.
Henry Ford despised the unions and had zero tolerance for them. Young recounted, “Like
the rest of us, though, I thought it advisable not to go public with my political orientation.
At Ford, job security was tenuous enough without personally insulting the old man, which
is what he considered any talk about collective bargaining.”16 Young was officially fired
from the River Rouge Plant for fighting with another worker. However, he believed the true
reason was his unionist sympathies. He soon found another job at an automotive plant and
this time, joined a union.
Coleman Young prioritized workers’ rights over civil rights. After he left Ford,
Coleman joined the United Auto Workers (UAW). The union did not work for civil rights. In
fact, the UAW discriminated against its black members and rarely allowed them to hold
Wilbur C. Rich, Coleman A. Young and Detroit Politics: From Social Activist to Power
Broker (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), 41.
16 Young and Wheeler, Hard Stuff, 41.
15
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leadership roles within the union. Within the union, there were black members who fought
internally for equal representation. However, Coleman Young did not actively fight for
these internal changes. Young lost his membership with the UAW when he lost his job at
the automotive plant. However, he stayed closely connected with the group.
Coleman Young used civil rights organizations to gain rights for workers. After the
UAW, he joined a labor-oriented civil rights organization called the National Negro
Congress. Coleman Young used the NNC to stay in touch with the UAW.17 Through the NNC,
Coleman Young met Reverend Charles Hill whom Young referred to as his “mentor and role
model.”18 Reverend Charles Hill attracted African American workers to the NNC.19 The
Reverend served as president of the organization and expanded its goals. Under his
leadership, the NNC became politicized in the name of equal opportunity for black workers.
The NNC aligned with the radical labor movement that consisted of socialists and
communists. Neither Reverend Charles Hill nor Coleman Young were political radicals.
Coleman Young did not follow one political ideology. Instead, he joined up with
politically affiliated organizations that fought for workers’ rights. During his time in the
UAW and NNC, Young combined civil rights with workers’ rights. He believed that the two
groups shared similar goals. However, Coleman Young did not fight for African Americans
within the unions. At this point, Coleman Young the politician emerged but without a party.
Young did not fight for African Americans within unions simply because he would alienate
himself from the leadership in doing so. In short, Coleman weighed his options and
pragmatically decided that prioritizing workers’ rights benefitted him more than fighting
Ibid, 44.
Ibid, 42.
19 Wilbur C. Rich, Coleman Young, 69.
17
18
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for civil rights. Although he understood political factions, he never associated with one
party until he ran for public office. World War II interrupted and changed labor rights and
civil rights in the US. Young joined the army and left for oversees to fight. When he
returned, the city had changed dramatically.

The End of the Golden Age: Racial Tension and Economic Shifts in PostWar Detroit
The social and economic state of postwar Detroit contributed to the 1973 election of
Coleman Young in changing race relations and restructuring the economy of the city.
Detroit as a capital of industry extends back to World War II. World War II allowed Detroit
to take its place as the industrial capital of the US. Sugrue states that with the need for war
supplies, Detroit industrialists, lead by Ford, “converted their assembly lines to the mass
production of military hardware, airplanes, tanks, and other vehicles.”20 Thus, industrial
factories grew and pumped profit into the entire city, attracting workers from the entire
nation.21
Industrialization in Detroit led major population growth during the 1930s and
1940s. In 1920, the population of Detroit was 993,678 people. By 1940, that number had
almost doubled to 1,623,452.22 The Great Migration, where many African-Americans left
the south in search of new opportunities, contributed largely to the spike in Detroit’s
population. Detroit is just one example of a larger national trend of increased African
Sugrue, Origins of the Urban Crisis, 19.
Between 1940-1943, the number of unemployed workers in Detroit fell from 135,000 to
4,000. Found in Sugrue, Origins of the Urban Crisis, 19.
22 Carl Wells, “Proposals for Downtown Detroit” (Washington, D.C.: Urban Land Institue,
1942), p 15; U.S. Census of Population (1950 data) in Thomas, Redevelopment and Race.
20
21
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American populations through the north. However, Detroit did not have the infrastructure
to adapt to such large population increases with no public housing and an economy
completely dependent on industries that fluctuated based on consumer demand. Also
coined the “most southern city in the north”, racism would forever plague Detroit and make
the population growth unmanageable.
African Americans suffered heavily from racism during and after the Great
Migration in Detroit. Just as the Young’s had done, many black families left the south
searching for opportunities in the north. With the large addition of African-Americans in
Detroit, many white people felt threatened and racism increased. In 1943, the Michigan
KKK membership gained hundreds of new individuals making it the largest in the nation.
The poor white class targeted successful African Americans and blamed them for many of
the problems that accompany urbanization. This displaced anger showed in the geography
of the city. Suddenly, there were exclusively black neighborhoods such as Black Bottom
that did not receive the same quality of public services or any at all.
World War II provided great employment opportunities for African-Americans.
Increased demand for wartime products lead to job availability for black workers. For
example, by the 1940s, 12% of Henry Ford’s workers were black from just a few years
before when the percentage was zero. As more blacks entered the work force, civil rights
organizations pushed for Unions to become integrated. In 1941, President Franklin
Roosevelt passed Executive Order 8802, which prohibited racial discrimination in
employment practices. The Order mandated that, “it is the duty of employers and of labor
organizations…to provide for the full and equitable participation of all workers in defense
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industries, without discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin.”23 The
Order signaled that civil rights organizations became increasingly effective during World
War II in gaining support from the government and a shift towards equality of races in the
work place.
Despite the job opportunities presented, African-Americans continued to suffer
from racism in the work place. While Henry Ford and many other factories opened their
doors to African-Americans, black workers were not given preferential jobs. Bosses also
used black employees as strike-protection. For example, in 1939, during the Dodge Main
strike, Chrysler used black replacements proving to the white employees that their shoes
could be filled. Thus, while the increase in African-American employment in many factories
provided opportunities, racism persisted.
As more African Americans came to Detroit and entered the workforce during
World War II, civil rights Activism increased. The Detroit chapter of the NAACP became the
largest in the nation because African Americans needed representation in the public
sphere. Before long, the NAACP and other groups began working with Workers’ Unions and
local government to ensure fair treatment of African Americans. In turn, civil rights became
a political issue. Sugrue stated, “the alliance between blacks and government – despite its
fragility – raised expectations and spurred thousands more black and white to civil rights
activism.”24
Detroit exemplified this newfound acquaintance between government and civil
rights. In 1943, city officials created the Mayor’s Interracial Committee to address the
Executive Order 8802 dated June 25, 1941, General Records of the United States
Government; Record Group 11; National Archives.
24 Sugrue, Origins of the Urban Crisis, 27.
23
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grievances of black city residents and to cool racial tensions.25 A sense of optimism towards
civil rights rose amongst liberal leaders and civil rights groups as antidiscrimination
policies were addressed and written into law. However, the optimism would be short lived
due to conservatives and many white Detroiters taking the opposite stance towards civil
rights.
Racism manifested in Detroit housing.26 The racial climate of Detroit intensified as
the black population increased. Furthermore, African Americans became more successful in
the postwar years and began to seek better housing. As the black and white populations
began to occupy the same space, white Detroiters tried to separate themselves from the
“other” Detroit through housing. Acts of violence followed black homebuyers in “white
neighborhoods.” In addition, homeowners’ associations and real estate agencies
perpetuated the antagonism. As a result, the Detroit citizens drew imaginary borders to
separate the two Detroits. Sugrue wrote,

The consequences of the creation of the divided metropolis were profound.
The physical separation of blacks and whites in the city perpetuated
inequality in housing and access to jobs, but no less significantly, it reinforced
the ideology of race held by northern whites. The ‘ghetto’ was not simply a
physical construct; it was also an ideological construct. Urban space became
a metaphor for perceived racial difference. Whites created a cognitive map of
The City of Detroit Commission on Ceommunity Relations evolved from the City of
Detroit Mayor’s Interracial Committee. The Interracial Committee was instituted by Mayor
Edward Jeffries late in 1943 as a response to the Detroit race riot of June, 1943. The
Committee was composed of the head of six city departments and five lay members. The
direct successor to the Committee was the Commission on Community Relations, which
was established by Detroit Common Council ordinance in 1953. The Commission was
composed of seven department heads and eight lay members until 1961, when Common
Council modified the Commission so that it became composed entirely of private citizens.
Found in Coleman A. Young Collection Part II, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne
State University.
26 Sugrue, Origins of the Urban Crisis, 190.
25

20
the city based on racial classifications and made their decisions about
residence and their community action in accordance with their vision of
racial geography of the city.27
When Black citizens crossed these arbitrary boundaries, they were met with hostility. The
manifestation of racism in the housing market caused along with growing racial tensions,
the 1967 race riots. Whites refused to occupy the same space as African Americans and felt
unsafe due to growing violence. This added to the federally financed suburbanization at the
time and came to be known as “white flight.”
Deindustrialization and the decentralization of jobs in Detroit caused many citizens
to leave Detroit for the surrounding suburbs. Although Detroit earned the name Motown,
the automotive factories were actually mostly outside the city. Other nonautomotive
industries existed within the city limits, but began to shut down due to a global economic
restructuring. As blue-collar jobs became limited in the city, many workers left for jobs
outside the city. As people left, businesses and consequently jobs followed. In almost all
cases, the suburbs with available jobs did not allow African Americans into their
neighborhoods. By 1973, the African-American population in Detroit grew to 40% of the
entire population.28 The population however had decreased from 1,849,568 people in
1950 to 1,500,000 by 1970.29 In a vicious cycle, the white population felt overwhelmed by
the shifting percentage of black citizens and fled to the suburbs.

Sugrue, Origins of the Urban Crisis, 228-229.
Introduction to in African-American Mayors: Race, Politics, and the American City, ed.
David R. Colburn et al. (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001), 5.
29 Thomas, Redevelopment and Race, 14. And also African American Mayors 35
27
28
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Demand for Change: The 1973 Election of Coleman Young
The polarized political situation over racial issues in postwar Detroit led to the
election of Coleman Young. Young was an excellent campaigner and successful politician in
his own right. However, as an African American dedicated to the liberal agenda, he became
the symbol of Detroiters commitment to a more radical approach to the city’s problems.
The 1974 election of Coleman Young meant different things for different groups in the city.
For the white liberals, Coleman Young was the solution to appeasing their estranged black
liberals in order to reunite a strong democratic party. African Americans no longer felt a
white mayor could or would correctly represent them. Thus, Young’s race played a large
role for both black and white voters. However, Young had to mobilize the moderate liberals
and conservatives in order to win office. The following section focuses on the political
climate of the United States and Detroit to demonstrate how Coleman Young became mayor
through a combination of existing conditions and his own political opportunism.
The changing social and economic landscape of postwar United States caused
political parties to include racial aspects in regards to civil rights in their ideologies. The
National Civil Rights Movement aligned with the Democratic Party, first under John F.
Kennedy then Lyndon B. Johnson. The black population relied on these administrations to
join the fight against racial inequality. President Johnson’s Great Society wanted first and
foremost to eliminate poverty. The “Great Society” also promised to racial integration and
equality. President Johnson implemented social welfare programs and racial policies to aid
the oppressed, which sparked the neoconservative movement. In a speech given in 1965,
President Johnson justified his actions stating, “Freedom is not enough. You do not take a
person who for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the
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starting line of a race and then say, ‘you are free to compete with all the others,’ and still
justly believe that you have been completely fair.”30 President Johnson took up the black
cause as a liberal cause. However, the black cause became a minor part of the liberal
agenda.
White liberals did not prioritize racial rights out of fear of dividing the Democratic
Party. Despite President Johnson’s declaration that freedom was not enough, the
Democratic Party shied away from any policies that were too radical leaving the African
American population without a true political representation. Desmond and Emirbayer
summarized: “They [white liberals] struck a devil’s bargain with white supremacy, telling
nonwhites that much progress had been made and that it was time to support a broader
liberal agenda, one that focused not on the wounds inflicted by racial domination, but on
general social uplift.”31 However, African Americans continued to fight for civil rights at the
micro-level.
Both the Democratic and Republican parties in Detroit radicalized due to racial
issues in the 1960s. Despite the national liberal party’s moderate stance, chapters of the
liberal party remained dedicated to civil rights in urban areas. In Detroit, Mayor Jerome
Cavanagh appointed many African Americans to leadership positions within his
administration. In response, the neoconservative ideology gained support as white
republicans accused the city government of reverse racism. As tensions rose, many white
liberals abandoned the civil rights cause in an attempt to reduce racial animosity. However,
the neglect of their needs led to African Americans splintering from the liberal party and
forming their own faction. Heather Ann Thompson, a history professor of 1960s and 70s
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radicalism concluded, “By 1967, with poor and working-class blacks growing disenchanted
with liberal’s strategies for effecting racial equality, with conservative white increasingly
convinced that liberals were catering to black needs over white, and with white and black
liberal leaders still fully committed to both the pace and parameters of their agenda for
change, The Motor City was veering toward a severe political crisis.”32 All political parties
had a racial component to their agenda and no parties felt satisfied with the governance of
the city.
African Americans did not trust the government of white institutions such as the
police force. By the late 1960s, the black population grew tired of the inability of
Cavanagh’s government to execute civil rights policies and took matters into their own
hands. The 1967 race riots marked a climax of mounting anger by many different groups in
Detroit. The riots erupted when the all-white police force raided an unlicensed bar and
treated African Americans unfairly. The confrontation was merely the spark that lit the
flame. The black reaction to police brutality, which was not out of the ordinary,
demonstrated the extent of the ordinary African-American citizens’ anger. In 1968, black
workers led strikes without the authorization of the unions. These events signaled that city
blacks no longer believed in the system. Thompson wrote, “These events demonstrated
that many city blacks had lost faith in traditional means of redress, in the formal political
process, and in the efficacy of strategies for achieving racial equality espoused by their
liberal leaders from city hall to the union hall to the pulpit.”33 The black Detroiters quite
Heather Ann Thompson, “Rethinking the Collapse of Postwar Liberalism: The rise of
Mayor Coleman young and the Politics of Race in Detroit,” in African-American Mayors:
Race, Politics, and the American City, ed. David R. Colburn et al. (Urbana and Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 2001), 228.
33 Thompson, “Rethinking the Collapse,” 228.
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simply were fed up with institutionalized racism in the public sphere and liberal leaders
cautious approach to such issues. Thus, black Detroiters resulted to untraditional means to
obtain their goals.
The 1970 Detroit mayoral elections demonstrated various opinions in how to solve
the cities problems. Mayor Cavanagh (elected 1962) sympathized with the civil rights
movement and integrated African American leaders into his own administration. However,
in the midst of the race riots and police brutality towards African Americans, Cavanagh
relied on conventional means to solve problems. As complaints from organizations such as
the Cotillion Club and NAACP increased, Mayor Cavanagh responded with forming
commissions to address African American grievances. However, these commissions did not
produce many results. White conservatives on the other hand felt that Cavanagh put
African American needs above their own and wished to restore the status quo. In the 1970
elections, all voters sought change, which reflected in the candidates: Black liberal, Richard
Austin and White conservative, Roman Gribbs.
The liberal party could not mobilize the white voters around a black candidate in
1970. Richard Austin, a self-identified moderate liberal, echoed many ideals of Cavanagh in
having a cautious approach to issues. White liberals supported him believing he would gain
the black vote and ensure that liberals stayed in power. However, the white conservative
backlash to Austin was so severe that many white moderate liberals voted for Gribbs out of
fear that a black mayor would make matters worse. Many white Detroiters threatened to
leave the city if a black man was elected. Another bout of white flight was postponed when
Gribbs won the election 257,312 votes to Austin’s 250,000.34 The election results
34
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illustrated the polarization of Detroit voters by almost 50-50. The election also
demonstrated that white voters, no matter their political affiliation, associated African
American with radical liberalism. Thus, swing voters decided to vote based on race rather
than ideology.
The two front-runners represented the polarization in Detroit politics at the time, as
neither was moderate. Thus, the election depended on which candidate could best mobilize
swing voters in their favor. Many candidates threw their names in the running for mayor,
but after the nonpartisan primary in September 1973, John F. Nichols earned 96,767 votes
while second place Coleman Young only earned 63,614 votes. Young campaigned based on
a dedication to liberal ideas, civil rights and most importantly the reduction of crime in
Detroit.
Detroit’s crime problem became the main issue in the 1973 mayoral race. Detroit’s
police force did not protect the African American community and had many complaints of
police brutality and corruption. Furthermore, as the economic situation in Detroit became
worse, crime increased. Young’s primary opponent was Detroit Police Commissioner, John
F. Nichols. With crime a growing problem in Detroit and the man responsible for the police
force as his opponent, Young attacked Nichols personally and blamed him for the failure of
the Detroit police department. In a pamphlet released by the Detroit Economic Club
supporting Young, members listed the three reasons to vote for Young: 1) To stop crime
left unchecked by Nichols, 2) End drug trafficking in the city and stop police corruption in
aiding traffickers, and 3) develop economic programs to give jobs and attract new
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industry.35 Young’s campaign focused on the incompetency of the police department and
made Nichols the man responsible. In this way, Young gained enough swing voters to
barely win over Nichols.
Voters elected Young as a black liberal who could mend Detroit’s economy. Although
crime became the main debate during the election to win over swing voters, many
individuals endorsed Young for his dedication to liberal policies as senator. In his campaign
pamphlet titled “Elect Coleman Young Mayor – Your future depends on it,” Young’s
campaign emphasized his dedication to urban revitalization in Detroit throughout his time
in Lansing.36 Thompson argued that although liberalism had died during the 1960s at the
national level, voters signaled a loyalty and desire for liberal urban government in Detroit
by voting Coleman Young based on his voting in the Michigan State Senate.37
The black population desired an African American mayor who would prioritize their
needs. Young was part of the first generation of African American mayors throughout the
United States and took a similar approach in ensuring a victory.38 As an African American
who grew up in Detroit, black voters identified with Young and believed he could
understand their situation. David R. Colburn, a history professor at University of Florida
concluded in his article, “African American Mayors, 1967-68,” that African American
mayors could count of black support if they came to vote. Thus, the challenge became black
voter registration. Young successfully emphasized the importance of voter registration and
made the process more accessible. According to Colburn, “The Young campaign added fiftyEconomic Club Pamphlet Oct 20, 1973 in Coleman A. Young Collection, Part II, Box 106,
Folder 13. Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University.
36 “Elect Coleman Young Mayor Pamphlet” in Coleman A. Young Collection, Part II, Box 106,
Folder 13. Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University.
37 Thompson, “Rethinking the Collapse,” 228.
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eight thousand black voters to the rolls.”39 It would be unfair to say that the black
population only voted for Coleman Young because he too was African American. However,
people vote for politicians based off who they believe will represent them best. African
Americans greatly distrusted the police force and city government due to police brutality
and lack of action taken by city leadership. Mayor Gribbs took a passive approach to civil
rights and the black community had grown tired of his lack of strength in dealing with
racial tension. In electing Coleman Young, black Detroiters expressed their need for a
leader who prioritized civil rights.
Many white voters believed electing an African American would relieve racial
tensions. Racism became institutionalized in Detroit and caused many black city-dwellers
to go against the system that did not protect them or represent them. The race riots scared
a great deal of white citizens who feared that if Nichols won the election, a similar scenario
would occur. Animosity between races increased with higher unemployment and more
competition for work. Many white liberals sought to reunite the Democratic Party in
Detroit and believed the only way to regain the African Americans would be to elect one of
their own. On top of that, Detroit had many white civil rights activists who actively
campaigned for Young. In securing enough white voters and making sure black voters went
to the polls, Young barely beat out Nichols 233,674 votes to 216,933.40 Even though Young
had won the election, he did not have the support of the city. He had to prove that voters
made the right choice in electing him.
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Developing a Public Image: Fulfilling Promises as a Black Liberal Leader
Coleman Young used his first term to ensure he had a future in the Manoogian
Mansion. In order to implement his long-term vision for the city, Young had to fix the
basics: crime, debt, and racial tensions. He fulfilled his campaign promises quickly and
efficiently, while limiting city spending. Young made friends with business leaders and
powerful Detroiters including Henry Ford II and pressured them to invest in the city.
Furthermore, Young created a public image through speeches and actions as a man
dedicated to civil rights and liberal ideals. Throughout his first term, Young started many
projects towards building the Detroit he envisioned. However, the first years as mayor
were spent building a foundation and gaining the trust of Detroit citizens. Young expertly
managed city finances and took on Detroit’s crime problem head on. The mayor’s first term
solidified his place in office for the years to come so that by his second term, there was no
doubt that Detroit had become Coleman Young’s city.

The Detroit Police Department
The newly elected Coleman Young quickly established himself as a strong Mayor. In
his inauguration speech, Mayor Young famously stated, “I issue a forward warning now to
all dope pushers, to all rip-off artists, to all muggers: It’s time to leave Detroit; hit Eight Mile
Road. And I don’t give a damn if they are black or white, or if they wear Superfly suits or
blue uniforms with silver badges: hit the road.”41 Although many white conservatives
believed Coleman Young spoke directly to them with this quote, he actually intended to set
Inaugural Speech, 1974 in Coleman A. Young Collection, Part II, Box 106, Folders 4-5.
Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University.
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the tone that he would take on a strong, centralized role in cleaning up Detroit’s crime.
Young’s first 100 days in office were extremely productive and once again gave both black
and white Detroiters hope that things would change.
As promised in his campaign, Young tackled the crime issue first to legitimize his
campaign against the former Police Commissioner. Obviously, he replaced his former
opponent Nichols with a five-person commission, with Commissioner Tannian as the
unofficial leader, who in reality restructured the police department. In his 100 Days Report,
Young stated his administration and Tannian were “Investigating charges of drug related
corruption in the police force,” and then added, “You made the right choice picking me and
not the former police commissioner who let these corruptions go on.”42 In these early days,
Coleman Young sought to not only make good on his campaign promises, but also further
legitimize himself as the correct choice. Thus, Coleman Young used the reworking of the
police force as a symbol of his strong and efficient leadership.
The police force underwent radical changes under Coleman Young. On February
13th, just over a month into his first term, Mayor Young issued his first Executive Order. The
Order provided (1) the implementation of police ministrations (2) the abolition of STRESS
(3) a 50-50 ethnic composition in the police force by 1977.43 Each of these parts aimed to
fix identified problems with the Detroit Police Department. The police “mini-stations” were
exactly as described: small versions of central departments complete with internal
hierarchies and administrations. The mini-stations addressed the fact that police often
Mayor’s 100 Day Report and 10-Point Plan in Coleman A. Young Collection, Part II, Box
106, Folders 6. Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University.
43 Police Mini Stations, Proposed Operation Procedure for Detroit Police Mini-Stations
submitted by James Bannon in Coleman A. Young Collection, Part II, Box 107, Folders 10.
Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University.
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refused to go into poor, black neighborhoods. The lack of presence by police caused crime
to flourish because there quite literally was no one there to enforce the law. The ministations would reestablish police presence by placing physical structures in the city’s most
dangerous places. By April 10th, 1974, Young’s new administration opened its first ministation and by the end of the year, over a dozen had popped up throughout the city.
The abolition of STRESS (Stop the Robberies and Enjoy Safe Streets) targeted the
former Commissioner Nichols who introduced the initiative. The STRESS initiative
exemplified police brutality towards African Americans. Commissioner Nichols
implemented STRESS to appease the white population, who claimed Detroit’s crime was
the direct product of increased African American populations. STRESS gave officers
permission to arrest citizens who looked “suspicious”. As expected, the suspicious figures
were only African Americans. STRESS converted the police force into a symbol for
institutionalized racism. During the 1973 electoral campaign, the Detroit Police Officer
Association Board of Directors, a supposedly unbiased governing board, released a
pamphlet endorsing John Nichols for Mayor demonstrating that racism in the police
department extended to the highest level.44 Thus, when Coleman Young disbanded STRESS,
the African American community viewed him as someone who prioritized their needs.
The final step of diversifying the police force gained the trust of the African
American community that had been lost, if such a confidence ever existed in the first place.
In an anonymous poll by the Detroit News in 1973, 83% of African Americans did not want
increased gun control (even though it was a liberal policy) because they did not believe the
Article II of the Associations Articles of Incorporation stated that the DPOA could not
align with any political party. The pamphlets were quickly recalled but continued to
circulate amongst conservatives.
44

31
police force could adequately protect them. Coleman Young wished to reestablish the
credibility of the police force while reinforce his place as a racial leader. Commissioner
Tannian conducted investigations of the Detroit policemen to find corruption amongst
officers and the police administration. These inquiries lead to the resignation of Nichols’
supporters as well as many individuals being let go. Mayor Young replaced the corrupt
officers with black, latino, and female officers. Furthermore, he allotted more funds to the
police department to commission more officers. By 1978, the Detroit Police Department
consisted of 5,800 members with 40% belonging to minority groups.
Coupled with the physical insertion of the police throughout the city via ministations and the sweeping away of the former, discriminatory structure, Coleman Young
created a police force that worked for all citizens rather than just a part. Studs Terkel, a
famous author and oral historian, stated in after visiting Detroit in 1975, “There’s a new
attitude in the city. The police are no longer looked upon as a foreign army of occupation.
But since ’74 not a single Detroit police officer has been killed in the line of duty…It reflects
a new respect between the people and the police.”45 The evidence of the changes lies in the
numbers. In the first three months of 1976, murder rates dropped by 28% and robberies
by 23%.46 The FBI released data showing that Detroit led all the cities in the nation in crime
reduction with Part I major crimes dropping 19.1% in 1977. Coleman Young succeeded in
keeping his promises from his campaign. The citizens of Detroit, although not all of them
may have voted for him, could not deny the positive effects of the made over police force
and in turn, crime in Detroit.
Studs Terkel Quote added in 1974-1989 in Coleman A. Young Collection, Part II, Box 59,
Folders 2. Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University.
46 1974-1989 in Coleman A. Young Collection, Part II, Box 59, Folders 2. Archives of Labor
and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University.
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Managing Financial Issues
Coleman Young recognized the financial crisis looming due to suburbanization and
deindustrialization. Mayor Cavanagh introduced the first income tax of 1% in 1962 to
balance the budget with the loss of population and revenue. In 1968, the income tax
doubled to 2% and in turn, the city became extremely reliant on taxes for revenue. The
increase in revenue through income taxes did not negate the loss due to
deindustrialization. Furthermore, many large industrial plants preferred the rural areas to
build due to cheaper property and less taxes. Mayor Gribbs, Young’s conservative
predecessor, overspent the city’s money on downtown revitalization projects increasing
the work force. Even with increased income and property taxes, the revenue could not
support the amount of workers employed by the city. Gribbs reacted by borrowing more
money and putting the city farther into debt. When Coleman Young got to office, he quickly
realized the city could not sustain its city paid workforce or upkeep city funded projects
without drastic changes.
Coleman Young addressed the fiscal crisis out of public eye in order to gain the trust
of Detroit voters while fulfilling his campaign promises. As a politician, Young understood
that public opinion hinged on creating a public persona that people identified with. On the
other hand, Young realized that in order to solve the financial problems of the city, he
would upset the very people who put him in office: African Americans, the declining
liberalists, and Democrats. Before making any major economic changes in the form of
personal tax income increases and employee cuts, Young built up his approval using the
improvement of the police force and addressing civil rights issues.
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Young expertly managed Detroit’s budget during his first term through pragmatic
approaches. However, he began to implement his vision for the city despite costs. In 1974,
Young allocated 4 million dollars to Belle Isle Improvements, the large city park in the
middle of the Detroit River known for the 1943 race riots. The park also housed Detroit’s
yacht clubs that discriminated against black membership. The city attraction became a
symbol for the cities failures in racial harmony. Thus, Belle Isle provided the perfect
starting point for Young to implement part of his vision because he could symbolically
signify improving racial relations through the literal rebuilding of the park. In improving
the park, Young also hoped to draw more suburbanites back to the city for recreational
activities. The Belle Isle project started Young’s make over of the River Front, a crucial
aspect of his vision for the city, which will be discussed later in this essay.
Young used his first term to build a coalition and centralize power in Detroit to
himself. Robert Green, a Michigan State urbanologist stated in 1977, “I have observed his
ability to work with business, labor, community leaders, and just ordinary citizens. He has
forged a business/labor coalition like I have no observed elsewhere in the country.”47
Young stayed true to his roots labor union roots from his liberal youth as mayor
Coleman Young’s first years in office cast the productive mayor as a champion of
liberalism and civil rights. Coleman Young used the first years to ensure re-election and
gain the trust of voters in order to pursue his own vision for the city. Young did so by fixing
inherited problems and creating a public persona that revolved around his role as an
African American Liberal leader. I argue not that Young took a passive role in civil rights or
that he only fixed the police force in order to gain public trust rather than truly protect the
100-Day Report in Coleman A. Young Collection, Part II, Box 59, Folder 1. Archives of
Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University.
47
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people of Detroit. However, it must be acknowledged that Young had other motives in these
actions. In 1977, city revenue exceeded debt for the first time since the 1950s. Young easily
won reelection due to not only the improved economy and reduced crime rates, but by
creating a strong public image that people trusted. Going into his second term, Young
completely controlled Detroit and had the freedom to not just fix Motown, but also build a
new city.

Hope for the Future: Economic Improvement and Relieved Racial
Tensions
Coleman Young entered his second term with the trust of Detroit citizens having
managed spending, reduced crime, and relieved racial tension. However, Detroit still had a
delicate financial situation. In the 1980s, Coleman Young searched for new ways to produce
jobs in Detroit. In his pursuit of increased business, we can see that Mayor Young strayed
from many promises he made in being elected to office. Furthermore, the 1980s marked a
decisive turn from many liberalist ideals that had been central to Young’s political career.
The transformation of the Mayor happened largely behind closed doors so-to-speak and
Young continued to portray himself as a black liberalist leader. His actions contradicted his
public persona begging the question of what motivated Young’s choices. Economic interests
could explain Mayor Young’s decisions at the surface level. However, something deeper
than just the economy motivated Young. In examining his pursuits and policies of his
second through fourth terms in office, Coleman Young’s vision for Detroit becomes evident
and makes sense of his lack of political ideology.
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The Moving Detroit Forward Plan: Envisioning a better Detroit
On April 30th, 1975, President Gerald Ford received a letter from Coleman Young
that explained the Mayor’s tagline for the city: “Moving Detroit Forward.” The Moving
Detroit Forward Proposal explained Young’s financial plan for the city. More importantly
however, the proposal was one of the first instances where we see Young’s vision for the
city really emerge. The Moving Detroit Forward Plan started with President Ford but ended
with Reagan. The letter would be the first of many correspondences between the
Manoogian Mansion and the White House. Following the evolution of the carefully
constructed plan, we too can see the evolution of Coleman Young’s vision for the city of
Detroit.
The Moving Detroit Forward plan encompassed all the issues in Detroit except race.
Young organized the plan into six target areas in order of priority: Employment, Industrial,
Commercial, Housing, Transportation, and Public Safety. The argument could be made that
race was a part of all of these categories and thus, the plan did aim to fix racial tension.
However, Young did not emphasize this aspect in the plan. For Coleman Young, Moving
Detroit Forward quite literally meant moving past issues of race. In the public realm, black
Detroiters assigned Coleman Young the role of a civil rights leader simply because he was
mayor and African American. However, Moving Detroit Forward and the vision he had for
the city extended past race and showed that Coleman Young did not truly embrace his
given role as leader of black liberalism.
The Moving Detroit Forward plan grew out of Coleman Young’s time in the state
senate. Coleman Young believed that the national and state governments should be held
responsible for the economic health of their cities. He constantly voted for welfare and
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urban development during his time in the state senate.48 In the 1970s, Coleman Young
focused his senatorial office on the revitalization of Detroit. Young’s time in senate
reflected that as an African American, people assigned the role of leader of civil rights to
him. However, if you look at his senate record he focused on the economic interests of
Detroit rather than the social aspects. The Moving Detroit Forward proposal mimicked his
efforts in senate.
Coleman Young sought federal aid with the Moving Detroit Forward proposal.
Mayor Young wrote to President Ford, “Detroit’s blueprint for action is before you. It is the
beginning of an answer. Reach out a helping hand, and Detroiters will grasp it and begin to
put to use the skills of a people who built an industrial giant, and who are ready to rebuild
one of the nation’s greatest cities. Let’s do it now – together.”49 Young framed Detroit as a
national responsibility. President Lyndon B. Johnson perpetuated the idea throughout his
presidency that the national government should support its urban cities through his “Great
Society” ideology. The Moving Detroit Forward initiative followed suit and asked
Republican President Ford to financially support a liberalist agenda in Detroit.
The 1975 Moving Detroit Forward presentation at the White House demonstrated
Young’s political pragmatism. The 200-page plan focused on reducing poverty through
employment in Detroit. Moving Detroit Forward advocated liberal policies such as funding
for public housing and training for the unemployed. However, the support for the plan
came largely from Republican Michigan Governor William Milliken, private conservative
Coleman A. Young Collection, Part I. Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State
University.
49 Coleman Young to President Gerald Ford April 1975, Moving Detroit Forward in Coleman
A. Young Collection, Part II, Box 103, Folder 6-7. Archives of Urban and Labor Affairs.
Wayne State University.
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investors, and the leaders in the auto industry.50 The plan cost $2.972 billion: $2.570 billion
in federal aid, $327.7 million from the Michigan state government, and $74 million local
funding from mostly private investors. Coleman Young and his Moving Detroit Forward
coalition estimated that the plan would generate 153,176 new jobs.51 If all went according
to plan, the Moving Detroit Forward initiative would reverse Detroit’s economic situation.
In order to gain federal funding and stimulate the economy, Young built a bipartisan
coalition to convince the national republican administration to invest in Detroit.
The six categories of the Moving Detroit Forward Plan outline Coleman Young’s
vision for the city. First, he believed employment opportunities must be present for anyone
who wants to work in order to create a sustainable economy. In 1975, the unemployment
rate in Detroit was 23%. Throughout his lifetime, Coleman Young learned the importance
of work and understood the negative side effects when work disappears. If Coleman
Young’s vision could be seen as a house, employment was the foundation, the walls, and the
roof. Without these things, you do not have a house just as without job opportunities, you
do not have a sustainable city. Everything was built upon employment and employment
simultaneously protected everything within the city from external factors.
Coleman Young wished to recentralize industry in Detroit. The second category of
the Moving Detroit Forward plan addressed industrialization, particularly the automotive
industry. Coleman Young needed the support from the auto industry to accomplish
Role Call of the Moving Detroit Forward Meeting: Governor William Milliken, Mayor
Coleman Young, Chairman of the Detroit Renaissance Project Max Fisher, President of the
UAW Leonard Woodcock, Chairman of New Detroit Inc Richard Gerstenberg, Chairman of
Ford Automotive Henry Ford II, Director of Delray United Action Council Gladys Woodard,
and City Council President Carl Levin.
51The plan estimated there would be 97,821 short term/temporary jobs and 55,355 long
term/permanent jobs. Within these jobs, 40,600 would be in public service and 30,000
would be for training.
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anything in Detroit. Furthermore, Young saw industry as a huge employment opportunity
for blue-collar workers that would also bring revenue to the city. In order to revive
industry, the city of Detroit would develop industrial corridors and parks within or closer
to the city rather than in rural areas. In order to do so, Young would give tax breaks to large
corporations, which further reiterated his unclear political ideology. The second aspect of
the plan for industry was to create incubator industries. Incubator industries focused on
supporting new businesses in order to diversify the economy. An essential aspect of
Young’s vision was to not only revive old industries, but also more importantly introduce
and nurture new industries.
For Young, the problems associated with suburbanization in Detroit could be solved
with commercialization of the city. By 1975, not only had a large percentage of the white
population left, but also successful African Americans began leaving the city in search of
better housing. As the citizens with money left, so did consumer markets such as shopping
malls, street boutiques, and other shops. Young believed the commercialization of Detroit
would motivate people from the suburbs to go to Detroit for goods rather and in turn
create a reliance on the city. Young used Chicago as a model where the city attracted
suburbanites through the arts and shopping, which engendered a pedestrian culture.
The rehabilitation of housing was crucial to Mayor Young’s vision of Detroit. The
housing problem in Detroit not only posed a spatial problem, but an aesthetic one. Despite
the vast amount of property in Detroit, 60% of all housing units were built prior to 1939
with 60,000 units considered “substandard.” In the initial Moving Detroit Forward plan, the
ultimate goal of the housing projects sought to attract middle class families back to the city.
Economically, suburbanization posed a tax problem to the city where a smaller population
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is forced to support the city. In bringing back affluent families to Detroit, Coleman Young
hoped expand the amount of taxpayers in Detroit. However, the rehabilitation of housing
held more than economic value for Mayor Young. The aesthetic of the houses motivated
Young who used physical structures as symbols of prosperity, a topic that will be addressed
later in this paper. Simply put, Coleman Young’s vision for the city revolved on the
attractiveness of the space itself.
The housing plan diminished civil rights efforts. Young spared no expense in in his
plan for new housing intended for “middle and upper income groups.”52 The plan
rejuvenated the riverfront. The large homes and neighborhoods would not be affordable to
enough African Americans in 1975 to make them successful. Thus, Coleman Young
perpetuated the housing segregation with his plan to bring back the upper-middle class. To
say that Coleman Young actively sought to oppress African Americans is completely
incorrect. However, to say that civil rights motivated his decisions also is false as evidenced
by his housing projects for the Moving Detroit Forward Plan.
Young mimicked the transportation systems of large, national cities in the Moving
Detroit Forward plan. In reality, urban sprawl and unavailability of cars left many
Detroiters immobile. Within the inner 12 square miles of Detroit, 50% of households did
not have a car available. Furthermore, 30,000 people under the age of 20 years old relied
on walking or buses for transportation. Improvements had to be made to existing public
transportation to mobilize these dependents. Young envisioned a rapid transit system
equivalent to the New York Metro or Chicago’s elevated train. In the first draft, Young did
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not define the logistics of his rapid transit system. However, he clearly felt that Detroit
needed a train-like public transportation in order to acquire status as a national city.
The last part of the Moving Detroit Forward plan was the public safety section. In
the presentation at the White House, Young did not prioritize public safety because at this
point, he had resolved many of the issues as promised in his campaign. The Moving Detroit
Forward plan asked for funds to reduce crime through Combined Agency Narcotics
Enforcement (CANE) and the strengthening of police facilities. Again, Young emphasizes
the importance of physical structures in building a city. The police facilities became
symbols of power and success for Young who used this tactic in governing the people of
Detroit.
The Moving Detroit Forward Plan provided the outline for all of Young’s policies to
follow. President Ford only granted $800 million of the $2.57 billion requested, an insulting
amount in Young’s eyes. Regardless, Young went on building his utopic city by constantly
reorganizing city spending. Young stated in 19 Young continued to propose the plan to the
federal government but received less federal aid when Ronald Reagan minimized federal
spending in cities. In 1977, Young and his coalition presented the 6th proposal of the plan to
President Carter. The 200 page plan of 1975 grew to 1000 pages filled with not only a more
detailed plan of how Detroit would spend the money and exact hypotheses of results, but
also examples of how Detroit had progressed in just a few short years.
The plan stayed consistent to the original indicating that Young’s vision for the city
stayed consistent just became more detailed in how he would go about making the plan a
reality. In the 1977 presentation, Coleman Young accused the federal government of
stunting Detroit’s recovery:
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“Our problems have not been caused by local mismanagement, but rather by
national economic trends aggravated by Federal neglect and policies which
have favored the suburbs at the expense of the city. For twenty years,
suburban growth has been subsidized by the Federal government at the
expense of the cities through policies, which gave the suburbs cheap roads,
housing, water, and other developmental necessities. This allowed them to
meet market demands for the replacement of aging central city housing and
precluded its construction of the inner-city.”53
Young demanded more money from the government to continue with his plan and forced
President Carter to accept responsibility for Detroit. Carter promised more federal aid to
Detroit over a 5-year period, which allowed Young to move forward with his vision.
However, the reality of the plan did not match the estimated outcomes of economic success
and an emergence as a great, national, city.

Building Detroit: The Vision versus Reality
Coleman Young’s vision for Detroit focused on three major objectives to which
everything could be tied: 1) Employment for any citizen who wished to work. 2) National
significance and 3) Physical appearance. As Young gained more revenue, he pumped it back
into projects that complemented his vision. The projects start from his first term and follow
all the way to the end. Going into the 1980s, the city seemed financially stable due to state
and federal aid, private investments, and increases in income taxes. However, by his last
term, Detroit could no longer support itself. While many individuals accused Young of
squandering away money on his large projects, he actually took a pragmatic approach in
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building his vision. The next section focuses on projects that Young considered
monumental and crucial in building his vision. By examining these projects and the policies
that accompanied them, we not only gain a clearer vision of Young’s vision but how the
mayor implemented his plan within the constraints of reality.

Signaling Detroit’s Rebirth: The Renaissance Center
The Renaissance Center became a symbol for Detroit’s resilience in the midst of the
urban crisis. Henry Ford II brought together CEOs of major Detroit businesses and leaders
of the auto industry to create a 51-member partnership called Detroit Renaissance, Inc.54
The construction for the massive building started before Young became mayor, however he
immediately joined the project upon election. The city and Ford’s investment group built
the cluster of skyscrapers to be office buildings, residential apartments, a hotel, and
shopping center. For Young, the RenCen (as it came to be nicknamed) filled all his
requirements for his vision. For the people of Detroit, the building represented the
enormous amount of changes Young implemented immediately in office. Governor William
Milliken dedicated the building in 1977 when it opened saying, “Renaissance center stands
as a symbol of what is possible when people live and work in a city combine their efforts
toward a common goal.”55Although Young inherited the project, the RenCen would forever
be associated with him by the people of Detroit. As its name suggests, the Renaissance
Center was the physical representation of Detroit’s rebirth.

Detroit Renaissance, Inc. was the largest private investment group ever created for an
American urban real estate venture. Thomas, Redevelopment and Race, 154.
55 John Holusha, “Detroit embarks on the Greening of its Riverfront,” New York Times, April
29, 1985. ProQuest.
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Young believed the RenCen would be the anchor in his attempt to commercialize
downtown. As mentioned in the Moving Detroit Forward Plan, the suburbs no longer relied
on the city for commercial needs. Young sought to reverse that trend and create a strong
pedestrian traffic in downtown with the Renaissance Center. The city assisted in making
the area around the RenCen attractive to accompany the huge structure. The venture cost
$357 million and defined the Detroit skyline. At first, people showed a great deal of
excitement over the building. Stores began to buy up space and risk-taking real estate
companies bought residential units. In almost all public speeches addressing the finances
or state of the city, Coleman Young discussed the Renaissance Center. In 1975, Young
stated upon the completion of the first building, “The Renaissance Center is a catalyst. It
symbolizes a dramatic flight of imagination and a quality of serious recommitments to
Detroit.”56 Young saw the Renaissance Center as the beginning of a domino effect that
would centralize commercial activity in downtown.
The RenCen could not sustain itself due to lack of interest from businesses and
pedestrians. By 1983, the center had a mortgage debt of more than $200 million and
defaulted on payments. Expensive, designer stores occupied the retail space but quickly
closed due to lack of customers. Most city livers could not afford the high price items and
suburban shoppers preferred their own malls. Ford moved some of their own Dearborn
offices to the RenCen to try and set an example for other businesses to follow. However, the
RenCen simply never took off and became what the Detroit Free Press called, “the country’s
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largest white elephant.”57 GM eventually bought the building but the RenCen remains today
as a city embarrassment.
Young never gave up on the RenCen and believed if he built up the river front and
found ways to make downtown more attractive, the building could make a come back.
Before its failure, Young used the building to gain national significance. The building
brought together Detroit’s richest leaders. Young used this coalition and the physical
appearance to sell Detroit as a professional destination for businesses and conventions, the
most significant being the Republican National Convention in 1980. Ronald Reagan stayed
in the Renaissance Center Hotel, which highlighted the growth of Detroit. Mayor Young
used the RenCen to present Detroit to the GOP and nation as a city with business
opportunity. However, the building did not ever become the center of commercialization
that Young had hoped.

Giving the People Something to Root for: Joe Louis Arena and the Sports Industry
Mayor Young built up Detroit’s sports industry to provide jobs and diversify the
economy. Detroit had three national sports teams: The Tigers, the Lions, and the Redwings.
Although sports may seem like a superfluous expense, Young valued them because they
gave Detroit national significance. Furthermore, the sports industry could provide jobs and
commercialize the spaces around them. Thus, Young dedicated city funds to provide space
for sports teams in Detroit. He started with the purchase of Tiger Baseball Stadium for
$1.00 win 1977 after a fire destroyed the press box. Young allocated $18.5 million of
“Towering Debts,” TIME 121, no 3, January 24, 1983. Academic Search Premier,
EBSCOhost.
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taxpayers’ dollars into sprucing up the over 50-year-old field. In doing so, Young wished to
build up fan attendance and present Detroit sports industry as alive and healthy despite
economic issues.
Young wanted to ensure that Detroit attracted national events. Similar to New
York’s Madison Square Garden, Young built Joe Louis Arena as a multi purpose venue to
support large-scale events. The Joe Louis Arena opened in 1977 with 20,000 seats.
Officially the home to the Red Wings, the arena also housed massive concerts, large
conventions, and other events. Ronald Reagan spoke from the Joe Louis Arena at
Republican National Convention. The Arena, located near the RenCen, would enclose the
commercial district Young wished to create in the downtown. In creating and supporting
the arena, which is city-owned, Young wished to not only produce revenue, but also
provide Detroit with a space to entertain and build a culture. The arena also provided
something the suburbs could not forcing those outside the city to make their way in.
The introduction of new sports venues and other new building projects distracted
Detroiters from underlying sociological and economic issues. Thompson referred to city
leaders with this style of governing as “messiah mayors.” Young deviated from a liberal
style of city management and transitioned to fiscally conservative approach as mayor.
Despite his original emphasis on building the police and fire departments, Young cut the
forces down by 2,000 and 500 people respectively. The city-paid employees decreased by
6,000 people from 1978 to 1984 under Young.58 The Mayor severely cut government
spending on public services and social programs. Due to an economic recession in the auto
industry in 1980, Mayor Young had to increase revenue and quickly. Young convinced the
58
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people of Detroit to vote an increase on their own income tax from 2% to 3% in an election
year, which he still managed to win. The fact of the matter is that the people trusted Young
to mange their money. He provided physical proof that he used city funds to improve the
city. Young reinvested city money into projects that worked towards his vision for Detroit
while pragmatically managing money.

Looking and Acting the Part: Reviving the River Front and the People Mover
In order to be viewed as a national city, Young insisted that Detroit must look and
act as if it was one. Young became fixated on two things he thought each major US city had:
A centralized commercial district and a rapid transit system. The River Front provided a
perfect location to develop property and had already been started with the Renaissance
Center. Young quickly developed a plan to rehabilitate the space that went above and
beyond functionality. Young’s elaborate plan for the riverfront focused on aesthetic in
order to provide a destination spot for city-dwellers, suburbanites, and tourists alike. The
Renaissance Detroit, Inc. group also funded many projects on the riverfront giving Young
further ability to play out his vision.
Young believed that cities developed from their bodies of water. In justifying the
massive spending on the riverfront, Young stated, “Most cities in this country developed
from their waterfront. So if we are going to rebuild this city, I thought it should be done
from the river where it all began. It was to me that this was the most valuable real estate in
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the state.”59 After Carter granted federal funding through Moving Detroit Forward, Young
bought three properties on the riverfront to be developed into accessible parks so that
pedestrians can access the river for the first time in decades. Young constantly compared
Detroit to other national cities and modeled the riverfront off of Boston. In order to build
up the economy, Young encouraged businesses to buy up the riverfront real estate and
offered tax breaks to buyers. Young imagined a riverfront of offices, homes, green space,
restaurants, and walkways to facilitate pedestrian traffic between everything. For the
mayor, the riverfront was the only location that could facilitate and support such
commercialization.
Young mimicked national cities in building a transit system. As mentioned in the
Moving Detroit Forward plan, many Detroiters relied on public transportation for mobility.
Young recognized this reality, but something else motivated him to pursue a $200.3 million
dollar elevated train. Young envisioned his new rapid transit system, also known as the
PeopleMover, as a symbol for Detroit’s technological progress and an official mark as a
large, productive city. Despite facing huge criticism in building a train in the car capital of
Detroit, Young opened the PeopleMover in 1983. The plan originally had a train system that
extended to the suburbs. However, due to limited budget, the PeopleMover became a one
tracked train that stopped at a few places within the inner five miles Detroit. One such stop
was the RenCen. In reality, the People Mover had little to no functional value and did not
help those who lived far away get to the city. In a 1987 poll by the Detroit Free Press, two
out of three people said the People Mover was a bad idea. However, Young pursued the
People Mover as a symbol rather than a solution.
John Holusha, “Detroit embarks on the Greening of its Riverfront,” New York Times, April
29, 1985. ProQuest.
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Young had the vision but not the people, thus making his commercialization
unsuccessful. A 1987 New York Times article stated, “The monorail [PeopleMover] shows
off a postcard view of the Renaissance Center area, but mostly serves as a reminder of the
downtown that once was…the monorail makes a trapezoidal loop past the bustling fringe
along the Detroit River and then snakes through blocks of boarded-up hotels and beauty
supply shops.”60 Young created physical spaces and envisioned commercialization would
follow. However, in his pursuit of the physical space, Young did not address the individuals
who would fill them. Detroit still had underlying societal issues that inhibited commercial
growth. Suburbanites preferred their safe, homogenous communities to the urban areas.
While Young tried to provide incentive in the form of shopping, culture, sports, and
beautiful space, he neglected to remedy underlying issues. Had the people of Detroit
committed to these spaces, the city had all the makings of a typical large US city, just as
Young envisioned.

Creative Solutions to Old Problems: Coleman Young’s Pursuit of the Gaming Industry
The lack of federal funding and the decline of the automotive industry forced
Coleman Young to find creative new solutions to old problems. In 1988, Mayor Young
proposed casinos as a new industry. Although the city legislature voted down the proposal,
Young’s pursuit of the gaming industry reflects the consistency of his vision, which
extended until the end of his time in office.
Coleman Young sought to add new businesses to the city with casinos in 1988.
During the 20th century, many cities throughout the United States introduced or increased
60
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their casino presence. Atlantic City and Las Vegas provided the model for gambling
dependent economies. Young did not want Detroit to become centered on the gambling
industry as with the previous mentioned cities. Coleman A. Young proposed the legalization
of casinos in saying, “My primary interest in the gaming industry is generated by my
understanding of the job possibilities it brings to a community.”61 Mayor Young wished to
stimulate employment with the addition of casinos despite the negative aspects of
gambling.
Fear of crime laid at the base of opposition to the casino industry. The attorney
General, Frank Kelley, and head of Michigan state police, Colonel Rich Davis concluded, “Las
Vegas style gambling in Detroit would bring with it major increases in street crime,
substantial involvement by organized crime, and the potential for public corruption.”62
These hypotheses stemmed from evidence provided by Las Vegas and Atlantic City police
forces. Street and organized crime greatly increased in gambling towns and would likely
affect Detroit much the same way and add on to existing issues of crime. During the 1980s,
Detroit faced a serious crime problem as budget cuts caused the police forces to
dramatically decrease their size and scope. Thus, the introduction of casinos would likely
make the Detroit crime problem worse.
Many Detroit citizens believed casinos would fundamentally change the character of
the city. Casinos, which are inherently “sinful”, would contribute to the negative, national
image of Detroit. Richard Van Dusen, a member of the Detroit Casino Gaming Study
Letter from Coleman Young Feb 11, 1988 to Commissioners Exploring Gaming Industry
in Coleman A. Young Collection, Part II, Box 100, Folders 5-6. Archives of Labor and Urban
Affairs, Wayne State University.
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Young Collection, Part II, Box 100, Folders 1-4. Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne
State University.
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committee commissioned by the mayor wrote, ”Detroit already has a serious image
problem…It is a problem which the Mayor and other civic leaders have worked diligently to
address.”63 Thus, many individuals on the Detroit Casino Commission believed the national
image problem outweighed the advantages that could be brought with jobs.
Coleman A. Young preferred the jobs and new business despite the change in image
Detroit would receive. In order to pass the legalization of casinos, Young created a
commission that varied in profession, political factions, and race. In his appointment letter
to members of the Commission, Young wrote, “Throughout my administration I have
worked to increase employment possibilities for Detroit’s citizens…I consider the
deliberations of this Commission to be among the most important occurring in Detroit.”64
Mayor Young constantly sought to introduce new jobs, despite changing the city’s “image”
or perpetuating a negative image.
Mayor Young hoped that casinos would reinvigorate neighborhoods. Detroit, despite
many efforts made by the Young administration continued on the path of decay. The
Bureau of Labor Statistics Population Survey released in 1987 that 87,000 Detroit residents
were unemployed making the unemployment rate 18.2%.65 With the loss of work came
increased crime and other negative behaviors. William Julius Wilson, an American
sociologist and Professor of Social Policy at Harvard University highlighted the trends that
accompany unemployment in the urban poor:
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Neighborhoods that offer few legitimate employment opportunities,
inadequate job information networks, and poor schools lead to the
disappearance of work. That is, where jobs are scarce, where people rarely, if
ever, have the opportunity to help their friends and neighbors find jobs, and
where there is a disruptive or degraded school life purporting to prepare
youngsters for eventual participation in the work force many people
eventually lose their feeling of connectedness to work in the formal
economy; they no longer expect work to be a regular, and regulating, force in
their lives.66
Unemployment thus perpetuates unemployment. Without intervention from the
government, unemployment will not fix itself. This pattern was seen primarily in “large
industrial metropolises of the Northeast and Midwest, regions that experiences massive
industrial restructuring and loss of blue color jobs.”67 These syndromes manifested
strongly in Detroit where the neighborhoods were clearly segregated.
The introduction of casinos undermined Coleman Young’s earlier policies, especially
his focus on minimizing crime. His 1974 election had depended completely on his ability to
control Detroit crime and his success in fulfilling his promises directly contributed to his
reelection for a second term. Coleman Young understood the crime aspect of casinos, but
prioritized the jobs and commercial traffic casinos would bring over the negatives. In the
final report presented for a vote on the casino industry in June 1988, the Commission
presented a four part gaming model:

1.) Provide jobs, economic development and social benefits
2.) Protect against casino industry crime and casino related street crime
3.) Prevent organized crime, neighborhood crime, casino youth problems,
and other social problems

66
67

Wilson, When Work Disappears, 52.
Wilson, When Work Disappears, 34.

52
4.) Rehabilitate and Rejuvenate neighborhoods, the jobless, the poor, youth,
senior citizens, minority and women-owned small businesses in Detroit. 68
Although the commission dedicated two sections to casino industry crime, the report does
not provide details on how to fight crime except the addition of police near casinos from
the already shrinking Detroit Police Department. Parts one and four, however, are
extremely well documented. The final report demonstrated that crime barely factored into
Mayor Young’s motivations in introducing the gaming industry to Detroit. Instead, he
viewed the casinos as a way to provide jobs, increase tourism in Detroit, and pump life back
into the commercial businesses of Detroit.
Coleman Young failed to bring casinos to Detroit but his pursuit of the gaming
industry demonstrates the consistency of his vision for the city even until his last term.
Employment lies at the center of Young’s attempts to introduce casinos in Detroit. Again,
Young mimics other national cities such as Las Vegas. Looking back on Young’s Moving
Detroit Forward Plan, the casinos fit into commercialization. The casinos provided an
excellent example of Young’s style as mayor, which approached real problems with creative
solutions that contributed to Detroit’s image as a national city. Interestingly, the city of
Detroit later legalized the opening of three casinos in 1996.

The Beginning of the End: Coleman Young’s Last Term and Conclusion
The people of Detroit elected Coleman Young for the last time in 1990 despite
decreases in his approval ratings. Only 29% of the voter population came out to vote, but
Final Report on Gaming Industry in Coleman A. Young Collection, Part II, Box 100,
Folders 5-6. Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University.
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Young still won the election with a 2:1 ratio. In 1990, Young took a reactionary approach
rather than initiative as he had done in his previous terms. Despite having a vision for the
city, Young remained always realistic in his implementation and could no longer build the
city without putting Detroit into crippling debt. Thus, the 71-year-old Mayor’s last term in
office focused on keeping the fragile economic situation of the city from collapsing and
relying on previous accomplishments to boost morale.
Young carried out his vision through his last term within economic constraints. In
1985, Young contributed city funds to the building of the Chrysler Jefferson North Plant.
Young believed the plant would provide employment opportunities for Detroit citizens
while simultaneously boosting Detroit’s national significance. Young stated in support of
the plant, “We have to be able to compete internationally.” In pursuit of his vision, Young
began borrowing more than he ever had and from 1987 until he left office, the debt
increased. The borrowed money went towards building job opportunities for Detroit
citizens and downtown renovation projects. However, Young had lost much of the support
from his earlier coalition of politicians and business leaders and met much more opposition
in his final years. The mayor finally announced his retirement when he was diagnosed with
emphysema during his last term and took a back seat approach to governing as his health
deteriorated. In 1996, at the age of 79, Coleman Young died.
Young’s successors in office pushed Detroit farther into debt until eventual
bankruptcy in July 2013. When looking at the facts, Young remains the only mayor since
the 1950s to have brought the city out of debt. Nathan Bomey and John Gallagher from the
Detroit Free Press concluded, “Contrary to the typical portrait of him, Young may have been
Detroit’s most conservative modern mayor, attacking fiscal problems by shrinking
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government and forging new relationships with corporate American to build new Detroit
auto factories during his tenure.”69 However, the majority of Detroiters continue to blame
Young for squandering money on projects that did not last.
During his time in office, Coleman Young did not follow a political ideology or
consistently fight for civil rights. His twenty years in office can be traced through the
pursuit of a specific vision of a nationally significant city that had a multi-dimensional
economy and diverse cultural sphere. Despite the dramatic changes happening around him,
Young consistently let this vision guide him. In pursuing his vision for the city, Young
neglected long lasting racial tensions. Young presented himself as a leader and fighter for
the black cause. He constantly spoke out publically against white citizens who
discriminated against the black population, which became 70% by the time Young left
office. In electing Young, African Americans wanted a liberal leader who prioritized civil
rights above the rest of the liberal agenda. Young, however, took a passive approach to civil
rights. He believed if the city became a national city with a multi-dimensional economy and
cultural hub, the racial animosity would fix itself. Young aimed to make the suburbs reliant
on the city, economically but for social life, culture, and shopping.
Young identified with the Democratic Party but took a conservative approach to
running the city. Thus, Young did not adhere to any political ideology. The consistency
throughout Young’s time as mayor was his vision for Detroit as a nationally significant city.
However, Young only pursued this vision within the city’s means taking pragmatic
approaches to projects. Thus, when Detroit went farther into debt in the late 1980s, Young
slowed building and put his vision on the back burner.
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This essay sheds light on the capabilities of one man in rebuilding a city. All these
projects stand today as reminders of a desperate attempt to revive Detroit. Young’s critics
use failed projects such as the Renaissance Center and PeopleMover to demonstrate the
Mayor’s unnecessary spending on superfluous projects. However, the fact remains that
Young brought the city out of debt in his pursuit of a vision. As historians and sociologists
have both shown, much larger forces than Coleman Young played a role in Detroit’s
downfall. The question becomes then, what value is there in studying a vision that never
transpired of one man who despite being a strong leader with a great amount of support
could not overcome societal forces around him.
Studying Coleman Young and his time as mayor gives us a new lens in which to view
Detroit and its current situation. Retrospectively, there are many things Young could have
done but for the most part, the long-standing mayor acted extremely responsibly keeping
the city’s finances in check. Thus, in studying Coleman Young, we are forced to redistribute
agency to more than just one man in the creation of this crisis. Although scholars such as
Sugrue conclude that the conflict extends back to World War II, we could see moments
where Detroit seemed to move forward as in 1977. However, institutionalized racism, lack
of employment and population loss eventually wins out. Yet, studying Young and his vision
allow us insight into how these long standing issues weave into every aspect of Detroit
except the Detroit in Coleman Young’s head. As Detroit moves forward, scholars and the
public alike must contextualize Coleman Young within his surroundings. In doing so, the
magnitude of sociological problems reveals itself.
This essay addresses the way in which we should look at cities in crisis. Though no
major city experienced the same dramatic fall, parallels in deindustrialization and
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institutionalized racism emerge between Detroit and the many cities Young aspired Detroit
to mimic. Coleman Young’s vision guided him in making decisions through crisis. Although
it was not ultimately successful, Young pushed the city and explored many different options
such as the complete make over the River Front and the Casino industry. In thinking of
things that had never existed before, Young ensured that Detroit did not stay static.
Furthermore, he moved Detroit forward through physical projects that were incredibly
innovative. The Detroit Free Press stated that Detroit’s history is a series of “if only”
moments: “If Mayors Jerome Cavanagh and Roman Gribbs had cut the workforce in the
1960s and early 1970s…if Mayor Dennis Archer hadn’t added more than 1,100
employees…If Kilpatrick had shown more fiscal discipline.”70 In the case of Coleman Young,
I am inclined to turn the tables and say if only President Ford granted Detroit $2.8 billion to
Move Detroit Forward or if only the many new businesses Young tried to attract to Detroit
had come. In the case of Detroit and Mayor Coleman Young, we see the uselessness of a
vision without economic support and reparation of societal inequalities brought on by
suburbanization and racial animosity.
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